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The Arctic Council at Twenty:
How to Remain Effective in a Rapidly
Changing Environment
Oran R. Young*
The Arctic today differs profoundly from the Arctic twenty years ago
at the time of the transition from the Arctic Environmental Protection
Strategy to the Arctic Council. In another twenty years, conditions prevailing
in the region are certain to have changed again in significant ways. The
major changes occurring over the past twenty years are biophysical (e.g., the
recession and thinning of sea ice), economic (e.g., the increased accessibility
of Arctic energy resources), and political (e.g., Russia’s renewed aspirations
to great power status) in nature. A common feature of these changes is that
they are strengthening the links between what happens in the Arctic, treated
as a distinct region, and what happens in the overarching global system.
How are these changes affecting the role of the Arctic Council, and how can
the Council’s members position this body to maximize its effectiveness under
changed and changing circumstances? This Article seeks to answer these
questions. In the process, it touches on a range of topics, including the legal
and political status of the Council, the scope of the Council’s mandate, links
between the Council and other intergovernmental bodies, and the
administrative and material resources needed to enhance the effectiveness of
the Council. The concluding section identifies a range of changes that may
unfold in the coming years and asks what impacts they are likely to have on
the operation of the Arctic Council.
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INTRODUCTION
The Arctic Council, launched in 1996 under the terms of the Ottawa
Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council,1 has proven more effective
than most of us who were present at its creation anticipated.2 The key to the success
of the Council lies in the role it has played in identifying emerging issues, framing
them for consideration on the part of policymakers, and promoting these issues as
matters of priority on a variety of policy agendas rather than focusing on its ability
to make formal decisions, much less to play a prominent role in implementing such
decisions or moving them from paper to practice. To take a few prominent
examples, Arctic Pollution Issues: A State of the Arctic Environment Report focused
attention on contaminants like persistent organic pollutants and highlighted the
need to control transboundary flows of these contaminants; the Arctic Climate Impact
Assessment empirically documented the tangible effects of climate change in the high
latitudes and strengthened the foundations of the global climate negotiations; and
the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment provided context for ongoing efforts to devise
a mandatory Polar Code for commercial ships operating in Arctic waters under the
auspices of the International Maritime Organization (IMO).3
This “generative” role does not depend on the authority of a body like the
Arctic Council to make formal decisions, much less on the capacity to oversee the
implementation of policies once they are in place.4 Generative activities are modest
in some respects. They focus, for the most part, on the early stages of the overall
policy cycle rather than on the stages of decision making and implementation. But
it is important not to underestimate the significance of this role. As all students of
public policy know, the ability to frame the issues and shape the agenda can have
profound consequences for the course of public policy.5 While some participants
1. Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, Sept. 19, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1387
[hereinafter Ottawa Declaration].
2. For an extensive and well-informed account of the founding of the Arctic Council, see JOHN
ENGLISH, ICE AND WATER: POLITICS, PEOPLES, AND THE ARCTIC COUNCIL (Margaret MacMillan &
Robert Bothwell eds., 2013).
3. See Arctic Council, Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report, (L. Brigham & B.
Ellis eds., 2009), http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/detect/documents/AMSA_2009_Report_2nd
_print. pdf [https://perma.cc/2Y9Y-Y9S7]; A. Nilsson, Arctic Pollution Issues: A State of
the Arctic Environment Report, Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (1997),
http://www.amap.no/documents/doc/arctic-pollution-issues-a-state-of-the-arctic-environment
-report/67; Susan Joy Hassol, Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP),
Impacts of a Warming Arctic, Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (Carolyn Symon ed., 2004),
http://www.amap.no/documents/doc/impacts-of-a-warming-arctic-2004/786.
4. For a general account of the differences between generative, regulatory, and procedural roles,
see ORAN R. YOUNG, GOVERNANCE IN WORLD AFFAIRS (1999).
5. See JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 205–19 (1984).
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have sought to promote the idea that the Arctic Council can and should assume a
more prominent role in the making of policy choices, a central premise of my
analysis is that the primary role of this body will continue to center on issue framing
and agenda formation during the coming years.
At the same time, the broader setting in which the Arctic Council operates has
experienced far-reaching changes over the last twenty years. For purposes of
analysis, it is helpful to focus on specific changes and to think of them in terms of
biophysical, economic, and geopolitical forces. But these forces are interdependent
and highly interactive. The impacts of climate change, for instance, have played a
critical role in increasing the accessibility of the Arctic’s energy and mineral
resources. Geopolitical changes may give rise to a securitization narrative that raises
questions about the attractiveness of these resources. Taken together, therefore, the
impact of these changes on conditions prevailing in the Arctic is greater than the
sum of its parts. The consequences are certain to be felt going forward into the
future.
How will these changes affect the activities of the Arctic Council, and what
can and should be done to maintain the effectiveness of the Council as these
overarching conditions change? The first substantive section of this Article
provides a brief account of the drivers of change in the Arctic that are likely to have
significant implications for the pursuit of international cooperation in the region
and for the role of the Arctic Council in particular. A critical observation, in this
regard, is that one of the key consequences of these forces of change is a tightening
of the links between the Arctic as a distinct region and the global biophysical and
socioeconomic setting in which the region is situated. In the next section, I turn to
an analysis of the implications of the emergence of what many observers refer to as
the “new” Arctic for the operation of the Arctic Council.6 In the process, I address
several questions that have generated considerable interest among practitioners and
analysts alike: Would it be beneficial to formalize the status of the Council, making
it into a “normal” intergovernmental organization? Is there a case for broadening
the remit of the Council beyond the emphasis on environmental protection and
sustainable development specified in the Ottawa Declaration? What is the proper
relationship between the Council and other intergovernmental bodies, such as the
IMO, the OSPAR Commission, or the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission?
Are there ways to strengthen the administrative and financial capacity of the Council
that are both politically feasible and likely to enhance the effectiveness of the
Council significantly? The final section of the Article looks toward the future and
reflects both on changes in the Arctic going forward and on ways to maintain (or
even enhance) the effectiveness of the Arctic Council in light of changes to come.

6.

For a discussion of the “new” Arctic, see ALUN ANDERSON, AFTER THE ICE: LIFE, DEATH,
(2009).

AND GEOPOLITICS IN THE NEW ARCTIC

102

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:99

I. THE FORCES OF CHANGE
The Arctic is experiencing transformative biophysical changes, driven for the
most part by forces operating beyond the confines of the region. The impacts of
persistent organic pollutants (POPs) produced outside the Arctic but transported
to the region via waterborne and airborne vectors, where they bioaccumulate in a
manner that has detrimental consequences for human health, is now well-known,
partly as a result of the work of the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme,
operating initially under the auspices of the Arctic Environmental Protection
Strategy and subsequently under the auspices of the Arctic Council.7 The
dissemination of up-to-date and reliable information on the impact of POPs on
Arctic ecological and human systems is understood to have played a role of some
significance in the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the 2001 Stockholm
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants.8
Without doubt, however, the most important biophysical driver of
transformation in the Arctic is climate change. It is now well documented and widely
acknowledged that the impacts of climate change are unfolding more rapidly in the
Arctic than in any other part of the world. The iconic manifestation of this
phenomenon is the dramatic recession and thinning of sea ice in the Arctic Basin,
which has proceeded at a rate that exceeds the most extreme projections of bodies
like the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).9 This impact of
climate change has become a focus of intense interest in the private sector as well
as the public sector because it is the recession of sea ice that is making the Arctic
more accessible to those interested in extracting the region’s natural resources, and
to those interested in the region’s potential for commercial shipping. But the decline
of sea ice is by no means the only significant consequence of climate change in the
Arctic. Other important impacts include increases in coastal erosion resulting from
storm surges, the melting of permafrost, and, above all, ocean acidification, which
is particularly severe in the high latitudes due to the fact that carbon dioxide
dissolves more rapidly in cold water than in warm water. Positive feedback
processes intensify these effects. For instance, open water absorbs more solar
radiation than sea ice, a mechanism that increases the rate at which remaining sea
ice melts. Beyond these effects lies the impact of climate change on the Greenland
ice sheet. This ice sheet is now experiencing seasonal melting on an unprecedented
scale.10 Whether and when this process will lead to the disintegration of the
7. DAVID P. STONE, THE CHANGING ARCTIC ENVIRONMENT: THE ARCTIC MESSENGER
106–80 (2015).
8. See David L. Downie, Global POPs Policy: The 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic
Pollutants, in NORTHERN LIGHTS AGAINST POPS: COMBATTING TOXIC THREATS IN THE ARCTIC
136–637 (David L. Downie & Terry Fenge eds., 2003).
9. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., ARCTIC MATTERS: THE GLOBAL
CONNECTION TO CHANGES IN THE ARCTIC (2015), http://nas-sites.org/arctic/files/2015/06/
Arctic_Matters-booklet.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZC9U-MVEG].
10. Id.; WORKING GROUP 1, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
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Greenland ice sheet is a focus of intense interest in the scientific community. But it
is worth noting in this regard both that seasonal melt water on the surface of the ice
sheet triggers a positive feedback process by absorbing more solar radiation than
ice and that the volume of ice locked in the Greenland ice sheet is sufficient to raise
sea levels on a global basis by an estimated six to seven meters.
The collapse of sea ice in the Arctic in 2007 triggered an extraordinary wave
of speculation about a scramble for the Arctic’s natural resources, the dramatic
growth of commercial shipping in the Arctic, and the emergence of tensions and
even armed clashes associated with potential “resource wars.”11 It is easy enough to
grasp the appeal of the Arctic in an era of economic globalization. The U.S.
Geological Survey issued a widely read report in 2008 forecasting that the Arctic
contains some eleven percent of the world’s recoverable reserves of oil and thirty
percent of the recoverable reserves of natural gas.12 Numerous reports based on
simple geographical calculations presented projections regarding the attractions of
Arctic shipping routes when compared with alternatives like the Suez Canal Route.
The apparent political stability of the Arctic enhanced the appeal of Arctic shipping
routes in contrast to alternative routes afflicted by political instabilities, like those in
the Middle East, and by the growing problem of piracy. In the first flush of
enthusiasm, many casual observers concluded that the Arctic was emerging as a
critical region with regard to the future trajectory of economic globalization.
Today, less than a decade later, this picture seems far more complex and
generally less appealing in economic terms. Arctic energy resources and nonfuel
minerals are plentiful, but they are expensive both to extract and to transport to
markets. Energy economists, for example, argue that world market prices below
$80–90 a barrel will make Arctic oil uneconomical, an observation of great
importance given recent trends in the world oil market.13 Commercial navigation in
the Arctic is fraught with problems, including the continuing dangers of sea ice, the
shallow water in key channels, the lack of adequate hydrographic charts, the absence
of suitable infrastructure, and the difficulty of adhering to fixed schedules under
Arctic conditions.14 Current thinking is that container ships will not find transit
CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS (Thomas F. Stocker et al. eds., 2013),
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg1/WG1AR5_ALL_FINAL.pdf
[https://web.archive.org/web/20141126061207/https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/
wg1/WG1AR5_ALL_FINAL.pdf].
11. See ROGER HOWARD, THE ARCTIC GOLD RUSH: THE NEW RACE FOR TOMORROW’S
NATURAL RESOURCES 13–25 (2009); see also RICHARD SALE, THE SCRAMBLE FOR THE ARCTIC:
OWNERSHIP, EXPLOITATION AND CONFLICT IN THE FAR NORTH (2009); Scott G. Borgerson, Arctic
Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of Global Warming, 87 FOREIGN AFF. 63 (2008).
12. See Donald L. Gautier et al., Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas in the Arctic, 324
SCI. 1175 (2009).
13. Arild Moe, Potential Arctic Oil and Gas Development: What Are Reasonable Expectations?, in THE
ARCTIC IN WORLD AFFAIRS: A NORTH PACIFIC DIALOGUE ON THE FUTURE OF THE ARCTIC (2012
NORTH PACIFIC ARCTIC CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS) 227, 227–47 (Oran R. Young et al. eds., 2012).
14. Bjørn Gunnarsson, The Future of Arctic Marine Operations and Shipping Logistics, in THE ARCTIC
IN WORLD AFFAIRS: A NORTH PACIFIC DIALOGUE ON THE FUTURE OF THE ARCTIC (2013 NORTH
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passage over the Arctic attractive during the foreseeable future. Most Arctic
shipping will involve destinational traffic carrying bulk cargoes, such as natural gas
produced on the Yamal Peninsula in the Russian Arctic and shipped from the new
port of Sabetta.15 This is not to say that the role of the Arctic in the global economic
picture will be unimportant. But what does seem certain is that grandiose claims
regarding a new Arctic “gold rush” are unjustified, and the economic future of the
Arctic will be sensitive to fluctuations in global forces (e.g., the world oil market,
the stability of the Middle East) that are hard to forecast with any certainty and that
will make investment decisions involving developments spanning several decades
risky.
All these economic calculations are complicated by the impacts of geopolitical
changes. It is popular in some quarters to focus on renewed Russian military
activities in the Arctic, including the reoccupation of military bases abandoned in
the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the augmentation of the Northern
Fleet based on the Kola Peninsula, and the resumption of bomber flights in close
proximity to the airspace of other Arctic states. Some western observers
immediately jump to the conclusion that we are witnessing a resumption of the Cold
War and that the future of the Arctic will be marked by an increase in militarization
with all of the attendant dangers of action/reaction processes and unintended
clashes.16 The recent conflict over the future of the Ukraine has intensified such
expectations in some quarters. We now find ourselves engaging in serious
discussions about the prospects of insulating the Arctic from global geopolitical
developments in order to preserve the region as a zone of peace and prosperity.
Some concrete spillovers are already occurring, such as the suspension of the
collaborative effort between Rosneft and ExxonMobil to drill for oil in the Kara
Sea, a result of western sanctions imposed on Russia in connection with the conflict
in the Ukraine.17
In many respects, these arguments are exaggerated, reflecting an engrained
mindset rather than realities on the ground or on the water.18 The Arctic is no longer
an important theater of operations for strategic weapons systems of critical
importance to the military balance between the superpowers. There are no conflicts
in the Arctic itself that are serious enough to lead to armed clashes between or
among the Arctic states. Russian military activities in the Arctic are not remotely on
a scale that should be treated as worrisome by observers in other Arctic states. The
Arctic states have pledged to resolve issues arising in the Arctic under existing legal
PACIFIC ARCTIC CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS) 37, 37–38 (Oran R. Young et al. eds., 2013).
15. Id. at 74.
16. Oran R. Young, The Future of the Arctic: Cauldron of Conflict or Zone of Peace? 87 INT’L
AFF. 185, 186 (2011).
17. See LASSI HEININEN ET AL., RUSSIAN STRATEGIES IN THE ARCTIC: AVOIDING A NEW
COLD WAR 24–25 (2014), http://vid-1.rian.ru/ig/valdai/arctic_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/AJ8TRHQJ]; Clifford Krauss, Exxon Halts Oil Drilling in Waters of Russia, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2014, at B6.
18. See HEININEN ET AL., supra note 17, at 31.
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regimes like the arrangements set forth in the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea. Efforts to address specific issues, such as claims to extended jurisdiction over
the seabed in the Arctic, are unfolding in conformity with this pledge.19 There is no
evidence to suggest that the Arctic is becoming a zone of conflict rather than a zone
of peace.
Yet it is important not to dismiss the significance of geopolitical developments
on a global scale for the future of the Arctic.20 Russia’s recent initiatives, including
the annexation of Crimea and interventions in civil conflicts in Syria and the
Ukraine, reflect a deep-seated desire to be acknowledged as a great power on the
global stage, a desire that is hard to ignore given the fact that Russia remains a
nuclear power and that it has emerged as a major player in world energy markets.21
The rise of China, which is expected to overtake the United States as the world’s
largest economy in the near future, is another geopolitical development that cannot
be ignored. More generally, what we are seeing is a broad shift in the global
geopolitical landscape characterized by the (relative) decline in the dominant
position of the United States and the rise of a number of new (or renewed) great
powers, including India, Brazil, China, and Russia. In political terms, this means that
the world is shifting from a unipolar system to a new multipolar system.22 Whether
or not this development will introduce new instabilities on a global scale is a matter
of intense interest and debate among both practitioners and analysts.23 But it is
certain to have important consequences for the Arctic as a distinct region, and more
specifically, for the activities of the Arctic Council. The Arctic states continue to
dominate the work of the Council. Tensions between Russia and the West, even if
they are driven by non-Arctic concerns, will complicate efforts to reach a consensus
within the Council on a range of substantive issues. It will become progressively
harder to ignore the Arctic interests of China and even those of India, Japan, and
Korea, which are currently relegated to the rather marginal status of observer states
in the Council.
A common theme that runs through all these biophysical, economic, and
geopolitical forces of change is the tightening of the links between the Arctic as a
distinct region and the global system. One important inference to be drawn from
this observation is that global forces beyond the control of regional bodies like the
Arctic Council will play a prominent role in determining the future of the Arctic.
Although the impacts of climate change are being felt more dramatically in the

19. YOUNG, supra note 16, at 189.
20. I.N. Timofeev, World Order or World Anarchy? A Look at the Modern System of International
Relations 26, 33–34 (Russian International Affairs Council, Working Paper No. 18, 2014),
http://russiancouncil.ru/common/upload/RIAC_WP_18_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/PVA2ZYXG].
21. For a generally balanced account on Russia’s recent political initiative, see MARLENE
LARUELLE, RUSSIA’S ARCTIC STRATEGIES AND THE FUTURE OF THE FAR NORTH (2014).
22. JOSEPH S. NYE JR., IS THE AMERICAN CENTURY OVER? 95–96 (2015).
23. See Timofeev, supra note 20, at 5.
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Arctic than anywhere else, climate change is a global phenomenon driven by forces
far beyond the southern boundaries of the region. China, for example, now
accounts for about twenty-eight percent of the global emissions of carbon dioxide.24
Similarly, market prices for oil and gas and macro-level trends in patterns of ocean
shipping are determined by factors operating outside the Arctic region. An array of
factors including conflict in the Middle East, the behavior of OPEC, and advances
in extraction techniques, gives rise to a high degree of volatility in the world market
price of oil. The same is true of the geopolitical drivers. It would be a mistake to
interpret enhanced Russian military activities in the Arctic as a response to emerging
conflicts in the region. The shift toward a more multipolar global political system
has far more to do with developments outside the Arctic than with any regional
developments.
The relationship between the region and the global system is therefore
substantially asymmetrical. Global forces will shape the future of the region to a
large degree. Yet the flow of influence is not entirely unidirectional. Arctic feedback
processes affect the global climate system; the consequences would be particularly
dramatic if the Greenland ice sheet should begin to disintegrate. While Arctic oil
and gas is expensive, it is largely free of the political uncertainties associated with
production in many other regions. As a result, Arctic energy resources may play a
welcome stabilizing role in world markets that are known for their disruptive
volatility. Even in geopolitical terms, the Arctic may have some influence on global
developments. The Arctic region today is a zone of peace and prosperity, in which
major issues are resolved in a manner that is largely cooperative. Assuming the
Arctic states are able to insulate the region against spillovers from outside conflicts,
the Arctic may emerge as a model that those engaged in other regions will find of
interest as they consider the prospects for achieving conditions of peace and
prosperity in their areas of interest.
One observation that does emerge from this account is that non-Arctic actors,
including the European Union as well as states like China and India, must think not
only in terms of their Arctic interests, but also in terms of their responsibility for
the future of the Arctic. Countries like China and the United Kingdom, for instance,
like to characterize themselves as near-Arctic states, to describe the Arctic as part
of the common heritage of humankind, and to suggest that these considerations
give them a legitimate interest in decision making about Arctic matters.25 Without
attempting to evaluate these types of arguments, however, it is important to balance
the articulation of interests with an acknowledgement of responsibility for the
24. Global
Carbon
Budget
Highlights,
GLOB.
CARBON
PROJECT,
http://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/14/hl-full.htm [https://web.archive.org/
web/20151205023503/http://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/14/hl-full.htm].
25. See SELECT C OMMITTEE ON THE A RCTIC, R EPORT, R ESPONDING TO A C HANGING
ARCTIC, 2014-15, HL 115 at 34, 91–93 (UK), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
ld201415/ldselect/ldarctic/118/118.pdf [https://perma.cc/76SG-GHF4]; Elizabeth C. Economy,
China’s Imperial President: Xi Jinping Tightens His Grip, 93 FOREIGN AFF. 80, 88 (2014).
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biophysical and socioeconomic integrity of the Arctic. There is much to be said for
the proposition that a genuine expression of concern about matters of this sort
would make a significant difference in the receptivity of Arctic actors to initiatives
on the part of outsiders designed to increase their presence in the Arctic.
II. THE FUTURE OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL
What are the implications of this characterization of the rapid change in the
Arctic for the effectiveness of the Arctic Council? Does this account yield insights
that should be of interest to those in a position to make adjustments to the status
of the Council, its operating procedures, and its substantive priorities? It is apparent
at the outset that a preference for the status quo is not a viable option.26 The Arctic
is changing in ways that will impact the activities of the Council whether those in a
position to manage the activities of the Council like it or not. However, this is a
sweeping observation with policy implications that are by no means clear.
In this section, I explore the implications of the developments canvassed in
the preceding section for the activities of the Council in more concrete terms.
Specifically, I examine: (i) the legal and political status of the Arctic Council; (ii) the
Council’s remit; (iii) relations between the Arctic Council and other
intergovernmental bodies; and (iv) the administrative and financial resources
available to the Council. I cast the analysis in the form of questions and answers
dealing with each of these topics.
Would it be helpful to make the Arctic Council into a “normal”
intergovernmental organization? Many practitioners and analysts regard the legal
and political status of the Council as a defect to be remedied at the first
opportunity.27 The Council is based on a ministerial declaration that is not legally
binding. Unlike many other intergovernmental bodies (e.g., the Antarctic Treaty
System, the IMO, the World Trade Organization, the UN Food and Agriculture
Organization), the Council lacks the legal authority to make decisions that are
binding on its members. Even the recent agreements on search and rescue (2011)28
and oil spill preparedness and response (2013),29 both of which were negotiated

26. For a collection of papers originally presented during the conference, see THE ARCTIC
COUNCIL: ITS PLACE IN THE FUTURE OF ARCTIC GOVERNANCE (Thomas S. Axworthy et al. eds.,
2012).
27. There is a somewhat analogous debate about the status of the UN Environment
Programme, which is a body created under the auspices of a UN General Assembly resolution. Some
analysts believe that turning UNEP into a UN Environment Organization (UNEO) would enhance its
effectiveness substantially. See FRANK BIERMANN, EARTH SYSTEM GOVERNANCE: WORLD POLITICS
IN THE ANTHROPOCENE 65–77 (Frank Biermann & Oran R. Young eds., 2014).
28. Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic,
May 12, 2011, 13 T.I.A.S. No. 13-119 [hereinafter Search and Rescue Agreement].
29. Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the
Arctic, May 15, 2013, http://arcticjournal.com/sites/default/files/mm08_agreement_on_oil_
pollution_preparedness_and_response_signed_appendices_original_130510.pdf [https://perma.cc/
K8FG-545Q] [hereinafter Marine Oil Agreement].
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under the auspices of the Council, are not formal arrangements adopted by the
Arctic Council.30 The informal status of the Council is also reflected in the fact that
it is not an intergovernmental organization with the capacity to launch
programmatic activities or the authority to adopt an indicative budget that members
are expected to fund. This has not prevented the Council from creating a (small)
permanent secretariat located in Tromsø, Norway that opened for business in 2013.
However, it does limit the capacity of the Council in significant ways and ensures
that the Council is dependent on voluntary contributions from members to conduct
substantive work on specific topics.
Is this a serious problem? Might there be drawbacks as well as benefits
associated with making the Arctic Council into a normal intergovernmental
organization? Answers to these questions are rooted in my assessment of the nature
of the Council’s role and the sorts of resources required to play this role effectively.
If, as I have argued, the success of the Council lies in its ability to identify emerging
issues, frame them for consideration in policymaking processes, and push them
toward the top of the policy agenda, then the current legal and political status of the
Council may not be a serious drawback. The authority to make binding decisions is
not necessary to play this “generative” role effectively. In fact, a growing
preoccupation with policy making as opposed to policy shaping may actually detract
from a focus on what the Council does best.
Certainly, some material resources are needed to perform the generative
function well. I will come back to the issue of funding later. But it is important to
note at this stage that the resources needed to play a generative role effectively are
modest compared with the resources needed to address issues of administration,
implementation, and compliance that are prominent concerns of many normal
intergovernmental organizations.
What about the drawbacks associated with becoming a normal
intergovernmental organization? It is probable that such a transition would interfere
with some of the most innovative features of the Arctic Council, such as the practice
of including the permanent participants in virtually all the Council’s deliberations.31
It might also complicate the efforts of the Arctic states to run the Council as a sort
of club, excluding non-Arctic states from the status of members. Perhaps the most
serious drawback of such a transition, however, would have to do with the ability
of the Council to adapt nimbly to changing circumstances. It is notoriously difficult
to adjust the provisions of treaty-based intergovernmental organizations to ensure
that the fit, or match, between the organizations and the broader settings in which
30. They are, instead, multilateral agreements signed by foreign ministers who had come
together to participate in ministerial meetings of the Arctic Council.
31. The permanent participants are organizations representing groups of indigenous peoples
located in two or more Arctic Council member states (e.g., the Inuit Circumpolar Council) or multiple
groups of indigenous peoples located in a single member state (e.g., the Russian Association of
Indigenous Peoples of the North). Permanent Participants, ARCTIC COUNCIL, http://www.arcticcouncil.org/index.php/en/about-us/permanent-participants [https://perma.cc/CJ3U-MR5D].
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they operate continues to be good. In many cases—the Antarctic Treaty System is
a good example32—progress depends on the laborious and often protracted process
of negotiating new legally binding instruments. The Arctic Council, by contrast, has
exhibited a high degree of nimbleness in adjusting its practices to changing
circumstances on a more informal basis. Given the dynamic character of the Arctic
region described in the preceding section, there are good reasons to prize this
attribute of the Arctic Council.
Would it be advantageous to broaden the remit of the Arctic Council? The
mandate of the Arctic Council is well defined and strictly limited. The Council
inherited from its predecessor, the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy
(AEPS),33 a mandate to deal with matters of environmental protection. To this
mandate, the Ottawa Declaration34 added a concern for sustainable development,
construed as a “separate but equal” theme alongside environmental protection.35 In
practice this has proven to be somewhat confusing. In the mainstream
conceptualization of sustainable development, environmental protection is treated
as one of the three pillars, along with economic development and the protection of
social and cultural values. In a sense, therefore, the specification of the Council’s
remit in the Ottawa Declaration is based on a category error. The Environmental
Protection Programme should operate within the overarching framework of the
Sustainable Development Programme, rather than as a separate, co-equal, and
somewhat autonomous track in the activities of the Council.
This may account for the somewhat awkward nature of the Council’s activities.
Five of the Council’s six working groups deal more or less explicitly with matters of
environmental protection.36 Four of them were inherited from the AEPS and
developed personalities of their own prior to becoming Arctic Council working
groups. The Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG), set up to fulfill
the terms of the Ottawa Declaration,37 has struggled to define a clear-cut role for
itself within this system. The activities of the SDWG lack a core focus, are sensitive
to the activities of the other working groups with regard to turf, and are closely
controlled by the country holding the chairmanship of the Council.38 The Arctic
Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), for example, has produced
32. Oran R. Young, Governing the Antipodes: International Cooperation in Antarctica and the Arctic,
52 POLAR RECORD 230 (2016).
33. Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, June 14, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1624.
34. Ottawa Declaration, supra note 1.
35. Specifically, the Ottawa Declaration calls on the Arctic Council to “oversee and coordinate
the programs established under the AEPS,” Ottawa Declaration, supra note 1, at 1(b), and to “adopt
terms of reference for, and oversee and coordinate a sustainable development program.” Id. at 1(c).
36. See Lawson W. Brigham, International Cooperation in Arctic Marine Transportation, Safety and
Environmental Protection, in T HE A RCTIC IN W ORLD A FFAIRS: A N ORTH P ACIFIC D IALOGUE ON
THE F UTURE OF THE A RCTIC 115, 121 (Oran R. Young et al. eds., Korea Maritime Institute 2013)
(defining the Arctic Council’s six working groups).
37. Ottawa Declaration, supra note 1.
38. Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG), Operating Guidelines, para. 2, (May
14, 2002).
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guidelines for oil and gas development,39 and the Working Group on the Protection
of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) has conducted the Arctic Marine
Shipping Assessment (AMSA).40 But both of these topics have at least as much to
do with sustainable development as they have to do with environmental protection.
In short, there are significant issues regarding the allocation of policy concerns
among the various working groups of the Council.
Beyond this lie issues relating to efforts to expand the remit of the Arctic
Council to address a broader range of issues. Some of this takes the form of
establishing task forces to address issues that are regarded as having more or less
direct policy relevance, such as oil spill prevention, short-lived climate pollutants,
engagement with the business community, and cooperation with the science
community. Although not envisioned in the language of the Ottawa Declaration,
there is nothing to stop the Council from creating task forces so long as it is clearly
understood that their conclusions have no legal status. Individual task forces have
produced constructive results. But they can also lead to confusion and frustration
regarding the proper role of the Arctic Council. The Circumpolar Business Forum
Task Force played an important role in the launching of what is now called the
Arctic Economic Council, for example, but it is anything but clear what the
relationship between this new mechanism and the Arctic Council itself is or should
be.41 Given the fact that a high proportion of the short-lived climate pollutants
originate outside the Arctic and even outside the Arctic states, the capacity of the
Task Force on Black Carbon and Methane to address this concern was severely
limited. For the most part, its efforts were exhortatory, and there is little evidence
to suggest that those with the authority to address these concerns pay much
attention to the efforts of the Arctic Council.42
More broadly, there are increasing calls for the Arctic Council to take on issues
of security, whether these are framed as matters of military security, environmental
security, or even human security. The Ottawa Declaration has a (in)famous
footnote, inserted at the insistence of the United States, stating explicitly that the
Council should not deal with matters of military security.43 There is a lively debate
regarding the extent to which casting issues of environmental protection and human

39. Henry P. Huntington, Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, Arctic Oil and
Gas 2007, (Nov. 2007), http://www.amap.no/documents/download/1017 [https://perma.cc/
2WZT-9HCD].
40. Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report, supra note 3.
41. See, e.g., Michael Stickman, International Chair of the Arctic Athabaskan Council, Remarks
at the Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, Iqaluit 2015.
42. The proper division of labor between the Circumpolar Business Forum Task Force and
AMAP is also a source of some confusion. See, e.g., Anastasia Telesetsky, Overcoming Climate Inertia with
Unilateral Action on Black Carbon, in THE SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE OF SPACE LAW 245
(Paul Martin et al. eds., 2015); see also Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Progress
Report 2013–2015, at 1.
43. Specifically, the Ottawa Declaration states that “[t]he Arctic Council should not deal with
matters related to military security.” Ottawa Declaration, supra note 1, at n.1.

2016]

ARCTIC COUNCIL AT TWENTY

111

well-being as matters of security is a progressive step or a step in the wrong
direction.44 Given what I have said in the preceding section about the forces of
change in the Arctic, it is perhaps understandable that some practitioners and
analysts have a strong desire to broaden the remit of the Council to allow it to
address newly emerging issues and, in the process, to remain relevant to the Arctic
agenda. Understandable as this desire is, this could very well prove to be an
unproductive strategy.45 The Arctic Council is not well equipped to become a venue
for addressing broader questions of global climate change, and an effort to take on
issues of military security could easily undermine or tarnish the efforts of the
Council to address other concerns. Perhaps the way forward is to sort out the
internal confusion regarding the relationship between environmental protection and
sustainable development and to craft a coherent narrative to support efforts to
maintain the Arctic as a zone of prosperity.
How should the Arctic Council interact with other intergovernmental bodies
whose remit encompasses Arctic issues? Many other intergovernmental bodies have
mandates that cover issues that are relevant to the Arctic. At this stage, we are
particularly aware of the relevance of the IMO, which is the body with the authority
to adopt and promulgate the legally binding rules that will make up the Polar Code
applicable to commercial shipping in the Arctic. But there are many other
international organizations that can and do play similar roles. These include the
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the International
Civil Aviation Organization, and the World Trade Organization to name a few. To
make the picture more complex, it is worth noting as well that a wide range of
nongovernmental organizations, such as the Association of Arctic Expedition
Cruise Operators, the International Association of Classification Societies, and the
International Organization for Standardization, have also gotten into the act when
it comes to dealing with matters that have implications for governance in the
Arctic.46

44. See, e.g., Gregory D. Foster, A New Security Paradigm, W ORLD W ATCH, Jan./Feb. 2005, at
39,
http://www.worldwatch.org/system/files/EP181B.pdf [https://perma.cc/725X-25FT];
Diane French, A Case for Climate Security in the Arctic Council Agenda, S TIMSON (Feb. 2, 2015),
http://www.stimson.org/content/case-climate-security-arctic-council-agenda [https://perma.cc
/HVA7-REC7]. See generally Sumudu Atapattu, Global Climate Change: Can Human Rights (and Human
Beings) Survive this Onslaught?, 20 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 35 (2008); Richard A. Matthew, The
Environment as a National Security Issue, 12 J. POL’Y HIST. 101 (2000).
45. See Proposed U.S. Arctic Council Chairmanship Program 2015–2017, 22 (Feb. 2015).
46. See D AVID V ANDERZ WAAG ET AL., D ALHOUSIE U NIV. M ARINE & E NVTL. L AW INST.,
G OVERNANCE OF A RCTIC M ARINE SHIPPING 2, 3, 17, 39 (2008), http://www.dal.ca/
content/dam/dalhousie/pdf/law/MELAW/MELAW_AMSA_Governance_of_Arctic_Marine_Ship
ping_Final_Report__AUG1.pdf [https://perma.cc/CLE9-5CR5]; see also Ass’n of Arctic Expedition
Cruise Operators, AECO’s Guidelines for Expedition Cruise Operations in the Arctic (Oct. 2013),
http://www.aeco.no/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/2014-10-15-AECO-Operational-Guidelines1.doc;
Int’l Ass’n of Classification Soc’ys, Requirements Concerning Polar Class (2011),
http://www.aeco.no/guidelines/operational-guidelines/ [https://web.archive.org/web/016031
2064037/http://www.aeco.no/guidelines/operational-guidelines/]; Int’l Org. for Standardization
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Under no circumstances will the Arctic Council absorb the functions of any
of these other bodies. So, the question becomes how could or should the Council
interact with these organizations both individually and collectively? One response
to this question focuses on the role of the Council as a catalyst that can prompt
action on the part of other bodies and provide useful input into the deliberations of
these bodies. A particularly clear case-in-point involves the role of AMSA, a Council
effort carried out by PAME, with regard to the development of a legally binding
Polar Code under the auspices of the IMO.47 The Council itself lacks the authority
to make formal decisions about such matters. But there is no doubt that AMSA
stimulated international interest regarding this issue and provided background
information helpful to those negotiating the provisions of the Polar Code.
Conversely, there may be a role for the Arctic Council in overseeing the
implementation of the provisions of the Polar Code. The Council lacks both the
authority and the resources to assume responsibility for the implementation of the
Polar Code. But it may be able to help in monitoring the implementation of the
code, drawing attention to what is working well or not so well and engaging in
informed discussions of next steps in cases where there appear to be problems with
the performance of this regulatory regime. Commercial shipping is just one example
of the interaction between the Arctic Council and other intergovernmental bodies
with mandates to address matters of interest to the Arctic. Other opportunities of
this sort are easy to identify, and it is worthwhile to keep a sharp watch on the
emergence of such opportunities in a variety of issue areas.
Another response to the question about relations between the Arctic Council
and other intergovernmental bodies involves the adaptation of broader international
regimes to the particular circumstances prevailing in the Arctic. The 2011
Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the
Arctic, for instance, is designed to be nested into the broader framework of the
current version of IMO’s Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).48 A
similar relationship exists between the 2013 Agreement on Cooperation on Marine
Oil Spill Pollution, Preparedness and Response in the Arctic and IMO’s 1990
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-

(ISO),Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries—Arctic Offshore Structures (2010), http://www.iso.org/
iso/home/store/catalogue_tc/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=33690.
47. ARCTIC LAW & POLICY INST., UNIV. OF WASH., ARCTIC LAW & POLICY YEAR IN REVIEW:
2014 (2015), https://www.law.washington.edu/arcticlaw/reports/ArcticLawYearReview 2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F2YF-4E38].
48. The Search and Rescue agreement, although not primarily designed to prevent shipping
accidents, “calls for coordination and communication among the [Arctic States], including the exchange
of weather and ocean forecasts and warnings, joint exercises and training, shared support services, and
use of ship reporting systems for search and rescue purposes.” Andrew Hartsig et al., Arctic Bottleneck:
Protecting the Bering Strait Region from Increased Vessel Traffic, 18 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 35, 66 (2012). See
Search and Rescue Agreement, supra note 28; see also International Convention for the Safety of Life at
Sea, Nov. 1, 1974, 1184 U.N.T.S. 18961.
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operation (OPRC).49 In a sense, this makes the work of the Arctic Council
subordinate to the authority of other intergovernmental bodies like the IMO. But
this does not marginalize or trivialize the activities of the Council. In many areas,
conditions prevailing in the Arctic differ substantially from those prevailing in other
parts of the world. Devising regulatory measures that are well matched to Arctic
conditions is essential when it comes to maximizing their effectiveness in addressing
Arctic problems. And nesting these measures into broader arrangements like
SOLAS and OPRC may play an important role in maximizing their legitimacy.
An encompassing role pertaining to relations between the Arctic Council and
other intergovernmental bodies has to do with integrating or meshing the activities
of a variety of functionally specific arrangements. Thus, there are bodies competent
to address matters like safety at sea, marine pollution, fishing, ship-based tourism,
scientific research, and so forth.50 But none of these bodies has a remit to ask how
all these functional arrangements affect one another or fit together in such a way as
to form a coherent regime governing human activities in the Arctic. This is the issue
now discussed in the broader literature on international regime complexes in terms
of factors affecting fragmentation and integration.51 The Ottawa Declaration
certainly does not anticipate a role of this sort for the Arctic Council, and the
Council lacks the authority to make formal decisions of the sort needed to assemble
the pieces of this jigsaw puzzle into a coherent whole. Nevertheless, the Council,
operating largely through the activities of its working groups, is in a better position
than any other intergovernmental body to identify gaps and overlaps in the
initiatives of other bodies applying to the Arctic, to track the development of these
concerns over time, and to assess the pros and cons of various measures to address
these concerns.52 This is an ambitious role that could overstretch the capacity of the
Council in its current form. But it is worth noting that this important role would
not require any formal changes in the terms of the Ottawa Declaration and would
fit comfortably with the generative role that is central to the effectiveness of the
Council.
Are there opportunities to enhance the administrative capacity and to increase
49. The agreement includes a number of commitments for the member states of the Arctic
Council in order to address oil pollution that may affect the Arctic marine environment, including
requirements for preparedness and response systems, notification and information exchange, and
coordinated responses. See Sara Vinson et al., International Environmental Law, 48 INT’L LAW. 435, 439–
40 (2014); Marine Oil Agreement, supra note 29; see also International Convention on Oil Pollution
Preparedness, Response and Cooperation, 1990, 1891 U.N.T.S. 32194.
50. For example, the International Maritime Organization oversees the safety of navigation and
prevention of marine pollution. The Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization manages fisheries in
the northwestern part of the Atlantic Ocean. The International Arctic Science Committee is dedicated
to scientific research in the Arctic.
51. For a discussion of this literature, see Amandine Orsini et al., Regime Complexes: A Buzz, a
Boom, or a Boost for Global Governance?, 19 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 27, 27–39 (2013).
52. For a general account of “interplay management,” see MANAGING INSTITUTIONAL
COMPLEXITY: REGIME INTERPLAY AND GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE, at vii-ix (Sebastian
Oberthür & Olav Schram Stokke eds., 2011).
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the financial resources available to the Arctic Council? The Arctic Council is a
simple intergovernmental body. Under the terms of the Ottawa Declaration, the
chairmanship rotates among the member states at two-year intervals, and the chair
takes responsibility for organizing meetings and providing resources needed to
underwrite meetings of the Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs) and the biennial
ministerial meetings.53 Over time, this initial arrangement has evolved in a number
of directions. The individual working groups have secretariats of their own, mostly
supported by the relevant host countries. Individual countries have contributed
resources on a voluntary basis needed to carry out specific projects. An Indigenous
Peoples’ Secretariat has been able to provide some support for participation in
Council activities on the part of representatives of the permanent participants.54
More recently, the member states agreed to establish a permanent (but modest)
Arctic Council Secretariat based at the Fram Centre in Tromsø with a budget
sufficient to maintain a small professional staff. Nevertheless, the Council remains
a lightly administered body lacking the material resources needed to become an
influential player in its own right.
Is this a problem? So long as the Council prioritizes its generative role, it does
not need to grow into a more substantial organization with a sufficiently large staff
to become active in the realm of implementation and a dependable budget to
support a role of this sort. To the extent that my answers to the previous questions
are convincing, the current situation may not be in need of drastic restructuring.
One exception to this observation may relate to the integrative role described in the
answer to the preceding question regarding relations with other intergovernmental
bodies. If the Arctic Council becomes active in an effort to integrate sectoral
approaches to Arctic governance, even as a generative task, additional and dedicated
resources will be required. This is not a role that can be assigned to one or another
of the working groups, though the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme
has sometimes made helpful contributions in this realm in the absence of anyone
else able to play the role. In the nature of things, such an integrative role would
require personnel able to think systematically about linkages among distinct areas
and equipped with a specific mandate to engage in an effort of this sort. A budget
for this purpose would be essential, though it would not require additional resources
on a large scale.
Where the existing situation does leave a good deal to be desired is in the
provision of a regular budget to support normal Arctic Council activities. It is worth
differentiating at least three issues in this realm. First, the Arctic Council Secretariat
lacks the resources to conduct anything beyond a bare-bones operation. Second, as
53. Arctic Council, Revised Arctic Council Rules of Procedure, ¶ 10, (May 15, 2013),
https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/940/2015-09-01_Rules_of_Procedure
_website_version.pdf.
54. Erik Gant, History of the Arctic Council Permanent Participants, ARCTIC COUNCIL ( July 10, 2012),
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/our-work2/8-news-and-events/313-history-of-thearctic-council-permanent-participants [https://perma.cc/RL35-BF9J].
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the activities of the Council expand, the permanent participants are finding it
increasingly difficult to mobilize the human and material resources needed to play
an active role in the full range of Council activities. Since the development of the
role of permanent participants is one of the most innovative features of the Council,
this is a matter of considerable concern. Third, the working groups are at the mercy
of individual countries (and occasionally non-governmental bodies) willing to
contribute to the initiation and conduct of projects on a voluntary basis. This makes
it impossible for the working groups to exercise control over their own programs,
set priorities and invest resources in projects that they deem to be most important
to fulfill the Council’s mandate, and track the results of their recommendations on
a sustained basis. The result has been a hodgepodge of ad-hoc initiatives, moving
forward sometimes on a stop-and-go basis, that do not add up to a coherent
program and that often peter out without clear results. The problem is more severe
in some cases, such as the Sustainable Development Working Group—which is
controlled by the current chair but nevertheless lacks resources of its own—than in
others, such as AMAP—which has benefitted from long-term core support on the
part of Norway. It is probably fair to say that the resultant lack of programmatic
coherence constitutes the most serious organizational problem that the Arctic
Council faces today.55
What can we say about the feasibility of addressing the issues identified in this
section? In some respects, the needs of the Arctic Council are surprisingly modest.
As I have argued, it is probably unnecessary to turn the Council into a normal
intergovernmental organization. The principal challenge regarding the Council’s
remit has to do with internal issues, like the relationship between environmental
protection and sustainable development, rather than broadening the Council’s
mandate to tackle a wider range of concerns. The Council will not take over the
roles of other relevant intergovernmental bodies, like the IMO, ICAO, or FAO.
What is needed in organizational terms is an enhanced capacity to play an integrative
role focused on the need to address gaps and overlaps in the activities of other
bodies whose work has implications for the Arctic. The need for additional
administrative capacity and material resources is not large, at least by comparison
with the resources needed to operate most mainstream intergovernmental
organizations. Certainly, the bottom line would come to tens of millions rather than
hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars.
This is not to say that the status quo is fine, or that a little technical fine-tuning
will suffice to address the issues facing the Council today. Clearly, political will is
required to enhance the ability of the Council to operate as effectively as possible
under current conditions. In bygone days, when the Arctic was largely “out of sight
and out of mind” for those interested in international governance, mobilizing the
willpower needed to address such issues would have seemed an insurmountable
55. See Puala Kankaanpää & Oran R. Young, The Effectiveness of the Arctic Council, 31 POLAR
RESEARCH, 17176 (2012).
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barrier. But now, especially in the wake of the events of the last decade, the situation
is different. The Arctic has become a focus of unprecedented interest, not only for
the Arctic states, but also for states like China, Japan, and Korea and international
bodies like the European Union.56 The number of high-level conferences and
workshops dealing with Arctic issues is astonishing to those of us who worked on
Arctic issues when they were of interest only to a narrow band of Arctic specialists.
In such an environment, the level of effort required to come to terms with the issues
I have articulated in this section should not loom as an insurmountable hurdle.
III. WHAT LIES AHEAD?
There is every reason to expect the dynamism that has characterized the Arctic
in recent years to continue to be a prominent feature of the region during the
foreseeable future. Some of the resultant developments will have important
implications for the work of the Arctic Council. The forces at work are complex;
there is no way to predict exactly what form major changes in the Arctic will take.
Still, it is possible to identify and comment on a range of plausible developments
that illustrate types of change likely to have significant implications for the
operation of the Arctic Council. Consider, in this light, the following possibilities:
(i) the need to relocate whole communities in the Arctic due to the impacts of
climate change, (ii) changes in sea ice allowing for transpolar shipping that avoids
both the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage, (iii) the growth of mining
(including rare earth elements) as an economic activity rivaling oil and gas
development in the Arctic, (iv) the emergence of an independent Greenland altering
the composition of the group of Arctic states, (v) the intensification of bilateral
relationships (e.g., China/Russia, China/Greenland) as a major feature of Arctic
politics, and (vi) the development of more proactive policies on the part of nonArctic states regarding the high seas in the Central Arctic Ocean (i.e., the roughly
2.8 million square kilometers of high seas that lie beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction). How would these sorts of developments affect the operation of the
Arctic Council, and what steps could be taken to maintain the effectiveness of the
Council under the circumstances?
The principal effects of some of these changes will take the form of impacts
on the range of issues competing for the Council’s attention. American
policymakers have identified “Arctic climate adaptation and resilience” and
“improving economic and living conditions” in the Arctic as priorities for the U.S.
Chairmanship during 2015–2017.57 Most mining activities in the Arctic are likely to
take place on land controlled by individual states. But large-scale mining has
56. See Juha Käpylä & Harri Mikkola, Finnish Inst. of Int’l. Aff. (FIIA), The Global Arctic: The
Growing Arctic Interests of Russia, China, the United States and the European Union, 3, 8, Briefing Paper 133,
(Aug. 2013), http://www.fiia.fi/assets/publications/bp133.pdf [https://perma.cc/QTL6-XBF4].
57. See John Kerry, Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks at the Presentation of the U.S.
Chairmanship Program at the Arctic Council Ministerial (Apr. 24, 2015), http://www.state.gov/
secretary/remarks/2015/04/241102.htm [https://perma.cc/QE2N-X8Y6].
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important implications for sustainable development in the Arctic, and the
operations of bulk carriers carrying ore may loom large in the development of
commercial shipping in the region. The challenge for the Arctic Council in this
connection will be to devise a method to set priorities in the interest of
concentrating its efforts on issues of particular importance from a circumpolar
perspective rather than following the scattershot approach that has characterized its
activities in the past. A particularly important challenge will be to strengthen the
capacity of the Council to address issues that belong first and foremost to the
domain of sustainable development. In the past, the Council has done a better job
of dealing with matters of environmental protection than matters of sustainable
development. While environmental protection will continue to occupy an important
place in the work of the Council, both the biophysical and the economic forces at
work in the Arctic will highlight issues of sustainable development and put pressure
on those responsible for the activities of the Council to exhibit leadership in an
effort to find ways to foster sustainability in a dynamic region.
Other developments will pose challenges regarding the composition and
character of the Council itself. A dramatic case in point would be the emergence of
Greenland as a fully independent state with an overwhelmingly indigenous
population.58 There would be no reason to deny full membership on the Council to
an independent Greenland. But how would this affect the status of Denmark, whose
only remaining claim to membership on the Council would stem from its
jurisdiction over the Faeroe Islands? It might make sense in this situation to drop
Denmark as a member of the Arctic Council, though the Council has no explicit
procedure either for the accession of new members or for the de-accession of
existing members. And what would be the consequences of this stream of
developments for the role of the permanent participants? Greenland has been a
prominent force in the activities of the Inuit Circumpolar Council, one of the most
active and effective of the permanent participants. It seems clear that significant
adjustments would be called for in conjunction with this set of circumstances. It is
difficult to anticipate what form these adjustments could or should take. But the
basic point is clear: changes in the Arctic during the foreseeable future may raise
important questions not only about how to prioritize issues on the Council’s agenda
but also about how to adjust important features of the Council itself in the light of
major changes.
Beyond these considerations lie changes that would raise questions about the
relevance of the Arctic Council as the proper body to address Arctic issues.
Bilateralism that is largely economic in nature is a routine matter that has few
implications for the work of the Council. There is nothing out of the ordinary, for
example, about Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering (DSME), a Korean
58. The total population of Greenland is less than 60,000, but over eighty percent of those living
in Greenland are indigenous. See Michael Byers, Arctic Region, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 36 (2010).
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company, constructing LNG tankers for Novatek, a Russian company that is the
lead developer of Yamal gas reserves. But there is a more political form of
bilateralism that can become a competitor to the multilateral approach to regional
cooperation embedded in the work of the Arctic Council. China, in particular, has
often exhibited a preference for bilateral versus multilateral forms of cooperation.59
Recent developments involving Chinese-Russian agreements regarding Arctic
energy resources and Chinese-Greenlandic discussions regarding the exploitation of
mineral resources in Greenland exemplify this preference.60 Similarly, the growth of
Arctic activities in areas beyond national jurisdiction (e.g., transpolar shipping)
would pose a difficult problem for the Arctic Council. Regardless of the ultimate
disposition of coastal state claims to jurisdiction over the seabed in the Arctic, the
water column and the surface of the Central Arctic Ocean along with the
superjacent airspace will remain open to activities on the part of all signatories to
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. No agreement regarding this area would
be possible without the inclusion of a larger group of states than the eight members
of the Arctic Council. The recent European Union proposal regarding the
establishment of a marine sanctuary in the area around the North Pole is illustrative
in this connection.61 Developments along these lines would raise serious questions
about the scope of the Council’s remit and generate pressure either to alter the
composition of the Council or to acknowledge that some important Arctic issues
must be dealt with in other venues.
The changes discussed in this section should not be treated as predictions; they
are meant only to illustrate types of changes likely to occur during the foreseeable
future that will affect the operation of the Arctic Council. But they do suggest that
those responsible for the operation of the Council will need to confront three
classes of pressures on an ongoing basis: (i) those requiring the setting of priorities
for the work of the Council, (ii) those raising questions about the organizational
character of the Council, and (iii) those involving issues framed in such a way that
they lie outside the remit of the Council. There is every reason to expect that all
three types of issues will arise (often simultaneously) in the future and that an ability
to address them properly will have major consequences for the effectiveness of the
Council.

59. Elizabeth C. Economy & Michael Levi, BY ALL MEANS NECESSARY: HOW CHINA’S
RESOURCE QUEST IS CHANGING THE WORLD 74 (2014).
60. See, e.g., Press Release, Novatek, Novatek and the Silk Road Fund Conclude
Framework Agreement on Acquisition of Stake in Yamal LNG (Sept. 3, 2015),
http://www.novatek.ru/common/tool/stat.php?doc=/common/upload/press/_ENG.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U7FV-PNUU]; Press Release, Marketwired, Greenland Minerals and
Energy Limited: Kvanefjeld Feasibility Study (May 25, 2015), http://www.marketwired.com/
press-release/greenland-minerals-and-energy-limited-kvanefjeld-feasibility-study-asx-ggg2022780.htm [https://perma.cc/76SV-Z4N8].
p
61. Resolution on the EU Strategy for the Arctic, EUR. PARL. DOC., 2013/
2595(RSP) ¶ 38 (2014).
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CONCLUSION
The Arctic Council is dedicated to the promotion of peace and prosperity in a
rapidly changing region. Its particular focus is on issues that fit within the rubrics
of environmental protection and sustainable development. Since its establishment
in 1996, the Council has proven surprisingly effective, but not because it has
acquired the capacity to make authoritative decisions about transboundary issues
arising in the Arctic. The key to its success lies in its ability to play what I have called
a generative role. Maintaining the effectiveness of the Council during the
foreseeable future will be a challenging task. Success will depend on two critical
factors: (i) an understanding of roles or functions where the Council has a
comparative advantage and (ii) an ability to adapt to the changing circumstances of
the region in a prompt and nimble fashion. There are reasons to be optimistic about
the ability of those responsible for the work of the Council to understand and act
on these requirements. But success will require resistance to certain embedded
assumptions about the operation of intergovernmental bodies (e.g., the view that
the work of the Council should be underpinned by a legally binding instrument).
Managed properly, the Arctic Council can continue to exemplify an approach to
international cooperation that is not only well-suited to conditions prevailing in the
Arctic but also worthy of consideration when addressing issues arising in other parts
of the global system.
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